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ON ACTING BECAUSE OF A JOINT 
COMMITMENT
abstract
I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game 
theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions 
conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality. Then, I 
investigate whether acting because of a joint commitment is rational in some sense, focusing primarily on 
the phenomenon of asking and giving the permission to defect (fair defection) when a joint commitment 
is in place. I show that the obliteration of individual preferences prevents the possibility of rational 
fair defection. Finally, I analyze Gilbert’s recent suggestion concerning the introduction of personal 
preferences in her account, and I show that such introduction cannot solve the problem with the  
(ir)rationality of fair defection, and that personal preferences can hardly be consistently included in 
Gilbert’s account.
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In this paper I assume the general validity of Margaret Gilbert’s account, and I focus on a 
specific problem raising in this framework. The question that I will try to answer is: When I am 
part of a plural subject, what motivates my actions? What should I rationally do?
According to Gilbert, when a joint commitment is in place the people involved must act having 
this joint commitment as their motivation. Her thesis is that subjection to a joint commitment 
compels me from a rational point of view to act in a way consistent with its content: neither 
me nor my partners in the activity can remove the joint commitment at will, so I have 
sufficient reasons to undertake actions consistent with the collective goal expressed by the 
joint commitment. In Gilbert’s words, once people are jointly committed to pursue a goal as a 
body, the group’s goal becomes the unique motivational source for the actions of each of the 
parties (Gilbert 2006, p. 123), and thus, “a member’s action may often be explained without 
any reference to his or her own personal goals, values, or principles of action” (Gilbert 1996, p. 
268). As a consequence, the description of social actions in terms of joint commitment has the 
advantage of providing a unified explanation of the individual contributions to the action, even 
in the complete absence of reference to personal intentions or desires (Gilbert 2000, pp. 14-36). 
In other words, when a joint commitment is in place people involved act because of their joint 
commitment. A rational agent acting as a part of a plural subject must behave consistently 
with the intention to achieve the plural goal, and her behavior must be motivated by the joint 
commitment.
It is worth noting that the importance of joint commitment consists precisely in its 
functioning as a unified motivational source, since this unity confers stability to the 
cooperative outcome. Even though individual rationality can succeed in prescribing 
cooperation when specific circumstances occur, the existence of a joint commitment 
allows me to rely on the assumption that the others will cooperate. On the contrary, in the 
individualistic frame I must always consider the possibility that my partner might abandon 
cooperation.
The explanation of this kind of stability is psychological: as List and Pettit (2011, p. 193) put 
it, when people act in their capacity as group members, they experience a change in the 
perceived subject of intention and action. The reason is that the pronoun “we” has the 
power to provoke an immediate psychological response in the subject, inducing one’s self-
identification as a member of the group. The members of a group are thus the indivisible parts 
of a single center of agency.
1. 
Gilbert’s classical 




The departure from the singularist approach is also embraced (from a different perspective) 
by Michael Bacharach (2006), who presents a game theoretical analysis of cooperation quite 
sympathetic with Gilbert’s plural subject theory. Bacharach’s analysis is particularly useful to 
analyze the rationality of acting because of a joint commitment.
Bacharach’s starting assumptions are (i) that if a group is an agent, then it has its own payoff 
function (distinct from the payoff functions of its members), and (ii) that, if rational, the 
group agent will aim at the maximization of its expected utility. According to Bacharach – and 
consistently with Gilbert’s holistic perspective – the group’s preferences cannot be reduced to 
the members’ preferences, nor can the reasons motivating the group’s choice be reduced to 
the members’ reasons. Roughly, cooperative outcomes are explained by the individual agents 
propensity to group identify.
Group identification is a psychological response, primed by some objective features of 
the game (i.e., the immediate perception of a common interest and of the necessity of the 
others’ contributions).1 Group identification involves a shift of frame, a change in the agent’s 
conception of herself: a player who group-identifies conceives herself as part of a unified agent 
(Bacharach 2006, p. 70). The crucial effects of group identification are payoff transformation, 
cooperation, and agency transformation.
Payoff transformation corresponds to the unification of the motivational sources that is 
prompted by group identification. Since all the actions of the players are motivated by 
the group’s goal, group identification induces also a cooperative behavior within the group, 
(Bacharach 2006, p. 79). The mechanism that conveys these effects, and which is at the core 
of Bacharach’s account, is the agency transformation prompted by group identification. Agency 
transformation consists in the players’ adoption of a novel perspective with respect to the 
game. In summary, group identification causes the disappearance of personal payoffs, and a 
re-description of the game. (Compare this with Gilbert’s idea that being part of a plural subject 
causes a change in the perceived subject – from the “I” to the “we”).
To explain this point, let me consider the game in figure 1, which is a “Prisoner’s Dilemma” 
(PD). In PD, each player chooses among “cooperate” (C) or “defect” (D). Given the structure 
of the game, each player prefers the outcome in which she defects and the other cooperates 
1 Bacharach takes identification with the group to be basically a non-rational framework effect, so it is not clear 
where the commitment is supposed to come from. This seems to be an important point to explain the integration of 
Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment within Bacharach’s account. I think that this feature is consistent with Gilbert’s 
account to the extent that it is not always clear why individuals do enter a joint commitment. In what follows I offer 
an analysis of the motivations leading to the formation of a joint commitment, at least for those cases in which the 
framework effect is weak enough to leave space for a voluntary decision. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting 
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(“free-riding” situation); conversely, each player aims at avoiding the situation in which 
she cooperates and the other defects. The application of individual rationality leads to the 
solution (D,D). Yet, despite this prescription, both players might obtain higher payoffs if both 
cooperate.
Bacharach’s analysis of cooperation lies on the assumption that group identification causes 
the players’ understanding the PD as the game depicted in figure 2: the payoffs of this matrix 
are the payoffs of a group agent, which are achievable through the implementation of a certain 
profile of action by the original players.2
Note that the disappearance of personal payoffs and the new matrix of the game are not 
merely due to a change in the preferences of the individual agents: it is not simply that a 
group-identifier wishes spontaneously to promote the collective goal, rather she “thinks of her 
agential self […] as a component part of [the group’s] agency” (Bacharach 2006, p. 136). Agency 
transformation entails a change from the payoffs that govern choices for one unit of agency 
(the individual), in the payoffs that govern choices for another unit of agency (the group).
Group identification amounts to feeling a sense of collectivity, which prompts “team-
reasoning”. Team-reasoning is possible only if the players are in a frame in which first-person 
plural concepts are activated (Bacharach 2006, p. 135 and p. 141): “if a group-identifier thinks 
of herself as part of a ‘we’ […] it is only for us that she can intelligibly deliberate” (Bacharach 
2006, p. 145). The peculiar form of reasoning entailed by group identification, also, supports 
the holistic interpretation of the “we”, which cannot be reduced to the sum of individual 
motivations and actions: team-reasoning eliminates any reference to the individual, and 
allows the players to adopt a genuinely collective perspective.
The profile of action (C,C) in figure 2 – i.e., from the point of view of the collective agent – is 
insensitive to the distribution of gain among the participants.3 As Gilbert correctly points out, 
the obliteration of individual preferences due to the adoption of the plural subject perspective 
is a phenomenon that we can observe more clearly in particular kinds of groups (e.g., in 
marriage, in which people are likely to arrive to what she calls the “fusion of egos”). But the 
question is: besides being descriptively accurate, is the obliteration of individual preferences 
also rational?
In particular, Bacharach would say that the cooperative outcome (C,C) in PD is rational if we 
consider the collective agent as the subject of rationality, since (C,C) is the profile of action 
that maximizes its utility. Group identification transforms the original PD in the game in figure 
2, which is a game played by the collective agent, and which has a unique “collective solution”, 
the profile of action (C,C). 
The peculiarity of the collective solution of the PD is that it is inconsistent with the solution 
prescribed by individual rationality. According to Bacharach, this inconsistency influences the 
final outcome, to the extent that the players’ preferences toward a non-cooperative outcome 
lower the probability that they will group identify.
Nonetheless, in competitive frameworks, I can still rely on the other’s doing her part in the 
realization of the collective solution. Indeed, Bacharach claims that since group identification is an 
involuntary psychological response, activated by objective features of the situation, in framing the 
situation as a problem “for us”, an individual also gains some sense of how likely it is that another 
2 The discussion is open on the exact mathematical representation of the collective payoff. For example, it might not 
be a sum, but rather an average of the individual payoffs. What I am claiming here is just that, whatsoever form this 
measure may taken, it will always be insensitive to individual preferences.
3 A complete account would require the analysis of asymmetric PD games, since such games entail a number 
of different considerations (e.g., one of the player could justify occasional defection on the basis of egalitarian 
considerations). Alas, such a complete analysis goes beyond the limits of this paper.
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agent, facing the same situation, will we-frame it. Arguably, the more competitive is a game, the 
less intuitive – and the less probable – will be group identification (Bacharach 2006, p. 75).
The obliteration of the individual payoffs entails that the players might be required to act 
in contrast with the prescriptions of individual rationality. As in the PD, the adoption of 
the collective perspective results in an efficient solution. An objector might observe that, 
though the solution (C,C) is prima facie efficient for each player since it allows avoiding the 
worst profile (D,D), it is easy to see that each player can still maximize her expected utility: 
if I can assume that you will do your part in the collective solution, and I am rational, I must 
defect to obtain the profile (D,C). The answer to this objection is that “collective efficiency” 
is insensitive to the players’ individual payoffs – consistently with Gilbert’s non-summative 
approach to collective notions. The stability provided by the joint commitment is meant to 
prevent exactly this kind of strategic reasoning: in particular, the obliteration of individual 
preferences entails that once that I have adopted the collective perspective, and computed the 
collective solution, I cannot simply turn back to the individualistic point of view and adopt the 
assumption of your cooperation.
One consequence of the holistic character of joint commitment is that the members of the 
plural subject feel that none of them can rescind the commitment unilaterally, by simply 
changing her mind. In detail, Gilbert argues that if one has not been given the permission to 
defect, she, being rational, will not defect, because her motivations for action are not due to her 
personal preferences but rather dependent on the plural subject’s goal (Gilbert 2000, pp. 24-25). 
I will call this process of asking and giving the permission to abandon a joint commitment “fair 
defection”. Fair defection is meant to be the proper way to abandon a joint commitment, in 
contrast with simple defection, which allows the “abandoned” members to rebuke the defector.
Assuming the descriptive adequacy of Gilbert’s claim, I will now examine the rationality of fair 
defection. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the PD illustrated in the previous section, 
though I think that the conclusions (with minor modifications) are valid for all the cases in 
which there is a joint commitment.
The description of joint commitment in terms of agency transformation suggests that when 
we consider specific features of collective actions we should distinguish among individual 
rationality and collective rationality.
Consider the two agents P1 and P2, facing a PD. Imagine that they are jointly committed 
to implement the collectively efficient outcome (C,C). At a certain time, P1 undertakes the 
procedure for fair defection, by asking P2 the permission to abandon the joint commitment.
Let me focus first on P1 asking P2 the permission to defect, and look at the situation from 
the individualistic perspective. The first problem is that the adoption of joint commitment 
prevents P1 from referring to personal preferences as reasons to abandon the collective 
point of view: if P1’s individual preferences have been obliterated, she has no reason to desire 
defection. For the sake of the argument, let me still assume that P1 can for some reason turn 
back to individual preferences. As I observed above, is rational for P1 to defect if she knows that 
P2 adopts collective rationality (and thus, plays C); in order to rely on P2 doing her part in the 
collective solution, however, P1 should better not communicate her decision to stop doing her 
part in the collective solution.
Also, from the point of view of collective rationality, there are no reasons why a member 
should prefer defection: the collective solution is the best for the plural subject, regardless the 
distribution of the gain.
Thus, neither collective nor individual rationality command asking the permission for fair 
defection: collective rationality prescribes to avoid defection at all, individual rationality 
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Now, turn to P2 reasons to give P1 the permission to defect. If we consider P2 reasons from 
individual rationality perspective, there is a problem of regression: if P2 adopts individual 
rationality in deciding whether to give P1 the permission to defect, then P2 has in turn already 
abandoned collective rationality; if P2 asked P1 the permission to defect, there is a regression 
problem, while if P2 simply abandoned the joint commitment, then P1 does not need to ask 
the permission to defect (since the joint commitment is already broken). However, we might 
admit that P2 can adopt individual rationality, for example, because P1’s request signals 
that the joint commitment has lost the required stability. In this case, individual rationality 
commands P2 (i) not to give P1 the permission to defect and (ii) to defect: P2 should forbid P1 
to defect, so she can rely on P1 cooperation; in this way, P2 can do D and obtain her preferred 
outcome (C,D).
The other option is that P2 adopts collective rationality in considering whether to give P1 the 
permission to defect. Yet, from the collective point of view, giving P1 the permission to defect 
is never rational. As seen in the previous section, cooperation leads to the collective solution 
of the game (the collectively efficient profile of action), so the plural subject cannot maximize 
its utility if one of the members ceases to act in accord with the joint commitment. Thus, from 
the point of view of collective rationality, P2 should not give P1 the permission to defect. As a 
conclusion, neither individual nor collective rationality allow giving the permission to defect.
The above considerations hold only to the extent that personal preferences are obliterated 
and collective notions are interpreted in a non-summative and non-correlative way. The 
conclusion is that from the point of view of individual rationality, defection is not only 
permitted, but required, though it cannot be properly be considered an instance of fair 
defection in the sense illustrated by Gilbert. From the point of view of collective rationality, 
defection on the part of one member is never rational – and each member should do 
everything in her power to avoid the others’ defections.
So far, I have emphasized that the obliteration of individual preferences is a crucial element 
of Gilbert’s account of joint commitment. Also, I pointed out that this account of joint 
commitment is inconsistent with the rationality of fair defection.
In her recent book, Joint Commitment. How We Make the Social World (2013), Gilbert restates her 
thesis that joint commitment provides stability to collective actions, by preempting a decision 
contrary to the collective interest (Gilbert 2013, p. 93).
With specific reference to PD, Gilbert specifies that the adoption of the collective point of view 
entails that the players accept to do their part in a combination of actions that do not give 
them what they are most inclined to get. In general, one of the points that Gilbert makes about 
the motivational force of joint commitment concerns its capacity to “lead to relatively good 
outcomes for all in collective action problems of all kinds” (Gilbert 2013, p. 93; my emphasis).
The main problem with this claim is that getting a “relatively good outcome” is not the goal of 
rationality: by definition, a rational agent does not look at the “relatively good outcomes for 
all”, nor to a “relatively good outcome for herself”, but rather at the maximization of her own 
utility. Note that this holds not only for the individual agents, but also for the collective agent: 
the plural subject utility (if we persist in a Gilbertean non-summative approach) is insensitive 
to the distribution of utility among the members; the plural subject, thus, is not interested in 
the collective solution being “relatively good for all”, but rather in its being the best solution 
for the whole – the collective agent. Despite the problems raised by this specific formulation, 
however, the point is perfectly consistent with Gilbert’s classical account.
I want now to focus on another element, which Gilbert – quite surprisingly – adds to her 
account in the new formulation. I refer to the introduction of personal inclinations in the 








sections, the obliteration of individual preferences poses severe limits on Gilbert’s account. 
As a matter of fact, each participant in the activity has personal goals and preferences that 
differ, even substantially, both from the collective’s and from the other participants’ goals and 
preferences.
Perhaps, Gilbert has precisely the intent to avoid these consequences when she says that 
subjection to a joint commitment does not prevent one’s acting according to her own best 
judgment, and that joint commitment does not obliterate one’s inclinations. She goes on 
advancing the proposal of an “inclinations-plus-joint-commitment model of action”, on the 
assumption that such a model might “explain how, though rationality requires one to act in a 
particular way, there may remain a pull in the direction of acting contrary to reason’s dictate” 
(Gilbert 2013, p. 93).
Gilbert tries to combine two elements: the first one is the non-summative notion of joint 
commitment and the non-correlative apparatus that characterize her account; the other one is 
the respect of individual rationality.
Participation in collective agency – in particular, subjection to the underlying joint 
commitment – does not leave me free to do as I please, from a rational point of view. 
Among other things, it gives me sufficient reasons to act in a certain way, reasons I 
cannot remove at will. Second, it does not – how could it? – deprive me of my capacity 
to reason and to act according to my own best judgment. I may break away from a 
collective action in progress at any time – sometimes this may be rationally required, 
sometimes at least rationally permitted, sometimes not (Gilbert 2013, p. 91).
In the above quotation, Gilbert makes large use of the notion of “rationality”. It is unclear 
whether she is referring to individual or collective rationality, but the meaning of her claims 
changes drastically depending on the interpretation that we adopt. For example, she says that 
the subjection to a joint commitment doe not leave me free to do as I please from a rational point 
of view. If I am adopting collective rationality, this claim is trivially true, while if I am adopting 
individual rationality it is false, for the reasons investigated in the previous sections.
Also, Gilbert argues that one’s breaking away from a collective action is sometimes rationally 
required (or permitted). Yet, the analysis of fair defection provided in section 3, showed that 
individual rationality does always command defection, while collective rationality always 
preempt defection.
Does the introduction of personal inclinations introduce substantial changes in this analysis? 
It seems that the possibility of such a change depends on the relations among personal 
inclinations and joint commitment.
Though Gilbert has merely sketched the inclination-plus-joint-commitment account, 
without giving much details (indeed, she does not say many thing besides those in the 
above quotations), I think that with respect to the relation among inclinations and joint 
commitment there are two main options. The first option is that individual agents involved 
in the collective activity do not adopt the collective point of view, but rather experiment a 
change in their individual payoffs due to their perceived relations with the other members. 
Yet, this explanation is inconsistent with Gilbert’s approach, since it removes the role of 
joint commitment and reduces the problem to one to be solved by individual rationality. The 
second option holds that individual agents do in fact experiment agency transformation, 
but – contrary to the holistic interpretation outlined above – the collective payoff is sensitive 
to the distribution of the utility among the players: not only in the sense that a great deal of 
inequality might prevent the formation of a joint commitment, but also in the sense that the 
collective payoffs is not a monolithic value, blind to individual gains. This explanation seems 
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plausible, for it saves both joint commitment and a distinctive role for collective rationality. 
Yet, it is inconsistent with Gilbert’s account of joint commitment, because such a solution 
rejects non-summativism and non-correlativism.
In conclusion, it seems that there is not a straightforward way to introduce inclinations 
in Gilbert’s explanation of the motivational role of joint commitment, without bringing 
inconsistencies within the original view.
I showed that one problem with Gilbert’s classical account of joint commitment is that 
it conceptually requires the disappearance of individual preferences. I argued that the 
obliteration of individual preferences makes unintelligible the phenomenon of fair defection, 
which is the only way to exit a joint commitment. Then, I argued that the re-introduction of 
individual preferences recently sketched by Gilbert (2013) cannot respect the holistic spirit 
of her account. The introduction of an inclinations plus joint commitment account is hardly 
consistent with Gilbert’s general theory. In particular, there are two main risks, for one might 
exaggerate with the import of joint commitment to the detriment of individual preferences 
(and rationality), turning back to the classical joint commitment account and its limits; or, on 
the other hand, the introduction of individual preferences might result in the erasure of the 
stabilizing role of joint commitment.
I think that the problem examined here is part of a general and unsolved problem for the 
non-correlative accounts of sociality, concerning the relation among the individual and the 
collective level of explanation. Arguably, the problem of collective rationality as presented in 
this paper is likely to find a solution only after a general clarification of such relations.
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